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Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States: Fine Tuning the
Valuation Process in Countervailing Duty
Assessments
I. Introduction
Countervailing duties' (CVD) are imposed on foreign subsi-
dized 2 goods that enter the United States and cause material injury
to a United States industryA The purpose of a CVD is to offset the
unfair competitive advantage accorded foreign producers that have
received foreign government subsidies or incentives.
In every CVD proceeding, it must be determined whether the
government funding in question is a countervailable subsidy, and if
so, how it should be measured for purposes of imposing a duty. In
many cases, the measurement of a subsidy is more problematic than
the substantive determination of countervailability. 4 The three-part
I The term "countervailing duty" is defined as "a special duty levied for the purpose
of off-setting any bounty or subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture,
production or export of any merchandise... " Agreement on Interpretation and Appli-
cation of Articles VI, XVI, XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done
April 12, 1979, art. 1, n.4, 31 U.S.T. 513, 530 T.I.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted in H.R. Doc. 153,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1979) [hereinafter GATT Subsidies Code].
2 The term "subsidy" is used interchangebly with "bounty or grant" and includes,
but is not limited to:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sus-
tained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or
distribution.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982).
3 "Material injury" is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or
unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982). "Industry" is defined as "the domestic
producers as a whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective output of the
like product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that prod-
uct." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4). Under U.S. law, the Commerce Department is authorized to
impose countervailing duties on imported merchandise through its own initiative or upon
petition by interested parties. If the Commerce Department is persuaded by evidence that
a bounty or grant exists, an order to countervail will issue. See generally The Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, infra note 25; Murphy, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Under the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979: A Preliminary Analysis, 14 INT'L LAw. 203 (1980).
4 For a discussion of the issue of countervailability in the Michelin case, see Recent
Decisions, The Michelin Decision: A Possible New Direction for U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 6
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 237 (1974). On countervailability in the recent steel cases, see
Barshefsky, Mattice, & Martin, Government Equity Participation in State-Owned Enterprises: An
Analysis of the Carbon Steel Countervailing Duty Cases, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1101 (1983).
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judicial review of Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States5 illustrates the
problematic nature of many subsidy valuations.
In Michelin the Court of International Trade (CIT) rejected sev-
eral traditional, convenient, Commerce Department 6 valuation tech-
niques in favor of more precise, technical methods of measuring the
benefit conferred on the recipient of a subsidy. The court's tech-
niques will sharply increase future CVD assessments, and their un-
derlying analyses will provide much needed guidance in resolving
the thorny valuation issue.
II. Facts and Holdings in Michelin
In 1967 Industrial Estates Limited (IEL), an industrial develop-
ment agency charged with promoting economic development in
Nova Scotia, Canada, invited Michelin Tire Corporation 7 to establish
manufacturing facilities in the Province. When Michelin decided to
establish a steel cord factory and a tire factory in Nova Scotia, various
levels of the Canadian Government furnished cash payments, tax
credits, and low interest rate loans to Michelin to facilitate the estab-
lishment and expansion of the plants in two economically depressed
municipalities. 8
The Canadian Government granted Michelin $16 million and
permitted the company to change its method of recording deprecia-
tion on machinery and buildings to a more favorable method for
both tax and accounting purposes. 9 At the provincial level, the com-
pany received a $50 million loan at an interest rate of six percent and
grants worth $7.6 million.' 0 Locally, Michelin was accorded a re-
duced property tax on its plant sites."'
Exports from the Nova Scotia plants to the United States began
For a discussion of the countervailability of the New York subway cars from Canada, see
Note, Railcars from Canada: A Misapplication of the Countervailing Duty Law, 7 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 287 (1984).
5 Michelin X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,737 (1981),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Michelin v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143 (1981), reviewed by
Michelin Tire Corp v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 252 (1982), reviewed by Michelin Tire
Corp. v. United States, No. 83-136, slip. op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 22, 1983).
6 See infra note 16.
7 Plaintiff and Michelin Canada are subsidiaries of Michelin Investment Holding
Company Limited which is a Bermuda corporation that is part of the Michelin group under
Companie Generale des Establissements Michelin, the group's corporate parent, head-
quartered in Cerlmont-Ferrand, France.
8 The tire plant was established in Granton and the cord plant in the town of Bridge-
water, which donated a plant site to Michelin valued at $10,000. Recent Decisions, supra
note 4, at 238-39.
9 Id. at 239. The purpose of the incentives was to provide for the development of
economically depressed areas of Canada. Id. at n.8.
10 Michelin, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade at 149. The loan took the form of mortgage bonds is-
sued by Michelin and proceeds were used for construction of facilities between 1970-72.
Id.
II Id.
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in late 1971, and it became obvious that Michelin had established a
base from which to penetrate the U.S. market.' 2 By 1972, exports
from the Canadian plants totaled approximately nine million dol-
lars.' 3 Michelin stated that ultimately, the company would deliver
seventy-five percent of its Canadian production to the United
States.14
In 1972 the U.S. Rubber Manufacturers Association' 5 filed a
CVD complaint with the Treasury Department,' 6 questioning
whether the incentives afforded Michelin constituted a "bounty or
grant" within the meaning of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.17
The Treasury Department investigated and concluded that the in-
centives did constitute a "bounty or grant," and countervailing du-
ties were imposed on tires entering the United States after February
7, 1973.18
After Michelin's protest of the administrative determination was
denied, the company commenced an action in the CIT.' 9 The court
upheld the administrative finding of a subsidy, but rejected the
method chosen to allocate the loan in calculating the duty.20 The
court remanded the issue of loan value to the Secretary of Com-
merce for redetermination. 2'
When the International Trade Administration of the Commerce
Department 22 reported its redetermination to the CIT, the court, in
its second review, disapproved of the method used in analyzing the
12 Financial Post, Dec. 19, 1970, at 13, col. 4.
13 N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 39, col. 5.
14 Recent Decisions, supra note 4, at 239.
15 The U.S. Rubber Manufacturers Association, an interested party, is a trade associa-
tion for U.S. tire producers. The Association initially concealed the fact that it was the
moving force behind the complaint, but laterjoined the litigation in an amicus curiae brief.
Michelin, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade at 146.
16 The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, as amended by the Trade Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 331, 88 Stat. 1978 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 144 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1982)) [hereinafter the Tariff Act],
originally defined the administering agent to be the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other
officer of the United States to whom the responsibilities are transferred by law. The Secre-
tary of Commerce [hereinafter Commerce Department] assumed the functions of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury involving 19 U.S.C. § 1303 under Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979,
§ 5(a)(l)(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,275, 93 Stat. 1381 (effectiveJan. 2, 1980), as provided by § I-
107(a) of Exec. Order No. 12,188, Jan. 2, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 993.
17 Generally, § 303 of the Tariff Act levies a duty upon any foreign manufacturer or
producer that received, directly or indirectly, a bounty or grant on goods imported into
the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
18 T.D. 73-10, 1973-7 C.B. 11; Michelin X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 38
Fed. Reg. 1018 (1973).
19 Michelin, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143.
20 Id. at 168.
21 See supra note 16.
22 The International Trade Administration (ITA) is the agency of the Commerce De-
partment charged with administering CVD law. For purposes of this article, reference to
the Commerce Department includes the ITA.
1985]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
financial benefit of the federal grant.23 The court remanded again,
suggesting that the Department implement a valuation method that
considers the time-value of money.
In its most recent opinion, the CIT disagreed with the Depart-
ment's method of valuing money over time, including the discount
rate used in the calculation.2 4 The court sent the valuation issue
back to the administrative level, recommending its own formula and
discount rate for measuring the time-value of money.
III. Legislative and Judicial Guidance in Valuing Subsidies
In response to pleas by domestic industries for protection
against unfair foreign competition, Congress enacted the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979.25 The Trade Agreements Act and its legis-
lative history provide meager guidance in valuing subsidies for pur-
poses of imposing duties. While the Act established certain rules
governing the calculation of the net subsidy, 26 there is little guidance
for calculating the gross subsidy. A report on the Trade Agreements
Act by the Senate Committee on Finance states that gross subsidy is
the "value of the subsidy provided, or made available, and used." 27
In defining "value of the subsidy," the Report merely states that the
measure of a subsidy is its "commercial and competitive benefit" to
the recipient. 28 In its review of the Trade Agreements Act, the
House Committee on Ways and Means indicated that "reasonable
methods of allocating the value of . . . subsidies" may be used.2 9
The House Report does not indicate what the "value of subsidies" is
or should be.
International CVD law is even less helpful. The GATT Subsi-
dies Code, 30 which is implemented by the Trade Act, provides that
signatories to GATT should develop and set forth "the criteria for
the calculation of the amount of the subsidy.131 The signatories,
however, have not yet agreed upon the rules governing the calcula-
tion of subsidies. 32
Given this background, it seems the Commerce Department has
wide latitude in valuing subsidies for the purpose of assessing duties.
23 Michelin, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade at 254.
24 Michelin, No. 83-136, slip. op. at 3.
25 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
See also supra note 3.
26 A net subsidy is derived from subtracting from a gross subsidy, any payments made
to qualify for the subsidy, any loss resulting from deferred receipt of the subsidy, and any
other charges intended to offset the subsidy received. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (1982).
27 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86 (1979).
28 Id.
29 H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1979).
30 GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 1.
31 GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 1, art. 4, para. 2, n.2.
32 Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg.
18,006, 18,016 (1984).
[VOL. 10
COUNTERVAILING DUTY ASSESSMENTS
Indeed, the Senate Report merely directs that the Department use
"reasonable methods" of allocating the value of subsidies. 33 The
House Report also suggests the same reasonableness standard.
34
The judiciary has underscored the Department's freedom and
the requirement of reasonableness in interpreting and administering
CVD law. In United States v. Zenith Radio Corp. 3 5 the Supreme Court,
quoting Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Aragon,3 6 acknowl-
edged that great deference is given to the interpretation of a statute
by the agency charged with its administration. In reviewing an ad-
ministrative interpretation of a statute, the Court considers only
whether, in light of normal aids of statutory construction, the
agency's interpretation is "sufficiently reasonable."' 37 Moreover, the
Court need not find that the construction is the only reasonable one
to sustain the agency's application of the statute.
38
The Commerce Department recognizes that there are alterna-
tive methods of calculating the gross value of a particular subsidy.
39
As the principal agency for administering CVD law, the Department
has developed methods for valuing various types of subsidies that, in
the Department's opinion, best achieve the purpose of CVD law.
40
A. Valuing Direct Grants
The concepts of "benefit to the recipient" and "reasonableness"
have long been recognized by administrative agencies in calculating
the value of all types of subsidies.41 For example, the Commerce
Department has valued preferential rate loans at the difference be-
tween the actual rate paid and the commercial rate that would have
been available to the recipient. 42
33 See S. REP., supra note 27, at 86.
34 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. See also H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 433 (1979).
35 437 U.S. 443 (1978). Zenith involved the practice of the Japanese Government of
waiving commodity taxes on products exported from Japan while taxes were imposed on
products that remained in Japan. The Court upheld the Treasury Department's determi-
nation that such a practice did not constitute a bounty under § 303 of the Tariff Act, and
thus, was not countervailable.
36 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946).
37 Zenith, 437 U.S. at 450.
38 Id.
39 Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg.
18,006, 18,016 (1984).
40 Subsidies most frequently take the form of grants, loans, loan guarantees, and eq-
uity infusion, but may also include tax concessions, environmental programs, disaster re-
lief assistance, research and development assistance, exchange rate benefits, labor
subsidies, and forgiveness of debt. For the purpose of this article, only grants, the subsidy
at issue in Michelin, will be examined. For the valuation of loans, see infra note 42 and
accompanying text. For discussions on valuing all types of subsidies, see J. PATrSON, AN-
TIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAws, § 6.02 (Int'l Bus. & Law 3, 1984); Cold-
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Steel Products from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg. at 18,016.
41 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
42 Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,300, 26,308 (1982). See, e.g.,
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In most cases, the value of a direct cash grant is simply the
amount received. As the Commerce Department described it in the
1984 steel cases, the value of a grant is the "difference between what
the company paid for the funds (nothing), and what it would have to
pay on the market to receive the funds (the face value of the
grant)."'43 This is consistent with the "benefit to the recipient" stan-
dard expressed in the legislative history of the Trade Act.44
B. Allocating Benefits over Time
The most complex valuation issues arise when benefits are allo-
cated over the life of an asset or the period of a loan. Prior to the
1982 steel cases, the Commerce Department allocated the face value
of subsidies on a straight line basis over the appropriate time pe-
riod.45 For example, a loan of ten million dollars payable in ten
years would be countervailed at one million dollars per year for ten
years.
Determining the appropriate time period over which to allocate
benefits proved confusing, however, in light of what the Commerce
Department regarded as a legislative mandate to "front load" the
benefits. In a 1979 Senate Report 46 on the Trade Agreements Act,
Congress gave this example:
For example, allocating a subsidy in equal increments over the antic-
ipated 20-year useful life of capital equipment purchased with the
aid of the subsidy would not be reasonable if the capital equipment
gave the recipient of the subsidy an immediate significant competi-
Polypropylene Film from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,421 (1983); Pig Iron from Brazil, 44
Fed. Reg. 67,554 (1979). In Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304,
39,317-18 (1982) (final determination), the Commerce Department set forth its methodol-
ogy for ascertaining the commercial interest rate that would have been available to the
recipient. The Commerce Department typically constructs a comparable commercial loan
at the appropriate market rate (the benchmark) reflecting standard commercial terms. If a
comparable commercial loan cannot be constructed, the Department uses a national aver-
age commercial interest rate.
Numerous problems arise under such a methodology. For example, differences of
opinion may exist regarding "comparable commercial loan" and "national average com-
mercial interest rate." Furthermore, disputes have arisen over the use of a benchmark rate
when a history of loan activity for a specific recipient is available. See, e.g., Pigmentos Y
Oxidos v. United States, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,847 (1983), where a Mexican producer of lead
products subject to countervailing duties challenged the use of benchmark rates. Addi-
tionally, loans denominated in a currency other than the recipient's present valuation
problems. The valuation of preferential rate loans to an uncreditworthy producer poses
yet additional considerations. See generally J. PATrSON, supra note 40, § 6.02[3].
43 Carbon Steel Products from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 5142, 5148 (1984).
44 See supra note 28.
45 See, e.g., Carbon Steel Products from Brazil, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,394 (1982); Steel
Products from the United Kingdom, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,384 (1982); Carbon Steel Structural
Shapes from Luxembourg, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,364 (1982); Steel Products from France, 47
Fed. Reg. 39,332 (1982); Steel Products from Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,356 (1982); Steel
Products from the Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,372 (1982). See also supra note 42 and
accompanying text. When the steel cases were initiated, the second judicial review of
Michelin was pending.
46 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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tive benefit compared to what would be the situation without the
capital equipment and compared to the competitive benefit the
equipment would likely provide in the later stages of its useful life.
4 7
Thus, the Department allocated the face value of grants over one-
half the useful life of the asset purchased with the grant. It justified
this compressed allocation of grants as being in conformity with a
"congressional intent to front load the benefit of grants which aid an
enterprise in acquiring capital plant and equipment." 48 The Depart-
ment reasoned that the inherent nature of such grants was to bestow
disproportionate benefits in the earlier years when start-up costs are
higher, and assets are more productive, efficient, and require less
maintenance.4 9
The 1982 steel cases also alerted the Commerce Department to
the fact that allocating subsidies on a straight-line basis ignored the
fact that money changes value as it moves through time. 50 The De-
partment adopted the "present value of annuity method" 51 and be-
gan considering the time-value of money when allocating subsidies
over time.52 The Department explained this procedure when ap-
plied to a loan:
[W]e determine the subsidy value of a preferential loan as if the ben-
efits had been bestowed as a lump-sum grant in the year the loan
was given. We determine how much less valuable money is today by
applying a discount rate. . . . This amount is then allocated evenly
over the life of the loan [or the asset acquired]. 5 3
Present value computations traditionally have been based on a
47 Id. at 86.
48 Michelin, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade at 253.
49 Id. The Commerce Department allocates some small grants over one year regard-
less of whether a benefit is conferred over time. Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47
Fed. Reg. 26,300, 26,307 (1982).
50 Id.
51 This technique can be expressed in the formula:
1(+r)O (1-r)1 + (1"r)2 + +r)-1  ]
where PV = the grant amount in the year of receipt; X = the unknown amount of the
annual payment; r = discount rate; n = number of total years. When applied to a hypo-
thetical $10,000 grant over ten years, assuming the discount rate is 10%, the amount to be
countervailed every year would be $1,480:
x X X x
(i) 10,000 = + - + - + . . . -
1.10 1.11 1.12 1.19
(ii) 10,000 = x/1 + x/l.l + x/1.21 + x/1.31 + . . . x/2.36
(iii) 10,000 = x +.91x + .83x + .75x + .... 424x
(iv) 10,000 = 676x
(v) 1,480 = x
Total amount to be countervailed is $14,800.
52 The Commerce Department contends that front loading is still achieved through
such allocations. As long as the subsidy is allocated in equal increments over its useful life,
it is front loaded because money today is worth more than money tomorrow. Certain Steel
Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,317 (1982) (final determination).
53 Id. at 39,318.
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discount rate represented by the secondary market rate for long-
term government debt in the foreign country. 54 Justifying the use of
a risk-free bond rate, the Department explained:
When we allocate a subsidy over a number of years, it is not the
intention of the Department to comment on nor to judge the riski-
ness of the project undertaken with the subsidized funds nor to eval-
uate the riskiness of the company as a whole. Nor do we intend to
speculate how a project would have been financed absent govern-
ment involvement in the provision of funds. Rather, we simply need
a financial mechanism to move money through time so as to accu-
rately reflect the benefit the company receives.
5 5
Finally, in allocating a subsidy over time, the Department has
interpreted both domestic law 56 and international law5 7 as imposing
a limit on the total amount countervailable. The Trade Act speaks of
a duty "equal" to the net amount of the subsidy. 58 Likewise, the
GATT Subsidies Code seems to prohibit a signatory from imposing
a CVD in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist. 5 9 Thus,
a subsidy "cap" provides an upper limit on the total value of the
subsidy in calculating the CVD.
IV. Analysis of the Michelin Decisions
The Michelin decisions departed from traditional valuation prin-
ciples in three major respects. 60 First, the court rejected the Com-
merce Department's arbitrary half-life approach in favor of allocating
grants over the full useful life of the assets acquired. Second, the
court disapproved of the Department's use of the annuity method in
measuring the value of money over time. Finally, the court called for
the use of a more realistic discount rate than the risk-free bond rate
that the Department had been using.
A. Allocating Grants over Time
The original cash grants accorded Michelin were tied to the re-
54 Id. at 39,316.
55 Id. at 39,317.
56 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
57 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
58 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982).
59 GATIT Subsidies Code, supra note 1, art. 4, para. 2.
60 The court also rejected several minor refinements in valuation offered by the plain-
tiff to reduce the final duty assessment. Most significantly, the plaintiff urged the court to
consider tax savings in the valuation process. The plaintiff contended that the tax deduct-
ibility of interest expense would reduce the cost of alternative financing; thus, the benefit
of the subsidy should be reduced accordingly. Noting that the plaintiff paid no taxes dur-
ing the period involved in this case, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention. The
court's primary reason was that "secondary effects" should not be considered in such cal-
culations. Michelin, No. 83-136, slip op. at 14-15. Yet, it is difficult to distinguish tax impli-
cations from the consideration of the time-value of money, which is arguably a "secondary
effect" also. Tax consequences are no less ascertainable than a theoretical interest rate
that a company may have obtained with alternative financing.
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payment of the fifty million dollar loan during the construction of the
tire facilities. In 1972 when the facilities were completed, a new loan
was negotiated, freeing Michelin from applying the original cash
grant to the repayment of the original loan. Thus, the justification
for allocating the original grants over the life of the loan no longer
existed. In its first review of Michelin, the CIT directed that the
grants no longer should be linked to the repayment of the loan;
rather, the grants should be allocated over the life of the assets ac-
quired-the plant and equipment.6 1
While the court acknowledged that, as a general rule, allocation
of grants should take place over the full life of the assets they
purchase, it cautioned that the principle is not automatically applied.
Because of the possibility that subsidies may have a disproportion-
ately beneficial effect in the earlier years, the court encouraged the
Department to consider if the facts in Michelin justified shortening
the useful life of the assets purchased by the grants. 62
In its redetermination, the Department concluded that the law
required that the grants be allocated over one-half the useful life of
the assets acquired.63 In its second review, the court found that the
half-life approach was "arbitrary and not in accordance with the
law."' 64 The court had expected the Department to make a factual
determination as to whether plaintiff had actually experienced
greater benefits in the asset's early years. Instead the Department
arbitrarily applied a "procrustean" half-life approach that was not
supported by the facts or the law.6 5
The Senate Report on the Trade Act 66 merely expresses con-
cern that benefits might be experienced disproportionately in the
early years of an asset's life. A mandate for the automatic compres-
sion or distortion of an asset's life simply does not exist.6 7
Compression of an asset's useful life, or front loading, results in
a higher annual tariff paid over a shorter period of time. If an asset is
in fact more valuable in its early years, a higher tariff in the earlier
years is justified to reflect this. If an asset is not more productive
earlier, the Department's arbitrary half-life approach will exact a tax
that exceeds the benefit derived from the subsidy. This may result
61 Michelin, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade at 168.
62 Other considerations also existed for the court's desire to compress the asset lives,
thus increasing the yearly duty while shortening the number of years required to pay. For
example, Michelin had not disclosed the fact that the grants were no longer tied to the
repayment of the $50 million loan until the court's second hearing of the case which pre-
vented the Commerce Department from investigating other periods of allocation. Id.
63 Michelin, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade at 253. See also notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
64 Id. at 254.
65 Id.
66 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
67 The court approved the measurement of the lives of the buildings and equipment
to be 40 and 20 years respectively pursuant to IRS depreciation tables.
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even when an asset is more valuable earlier, but not twice as valuable
as the half-life approach presumes. Overvaluing a benefit clearly vio-
lates the well-recognized "benefit to the recipient" standard of mea-
suring subsidies. 68
B. Recognition of the Time-Value of Money
1. Generally
In its second decision, the Michelin court, struggling with the in-
equities of the straight-line method of allocating subsidies, recom-
mended the recognition of the time-value of money in valuing
grants. 69 The court remanded to the administrative level the deter-
mination of the particular method to be used in the case.
Regardless of the particular method chosen to reflect the time-
value of money, its consideration always will result in a higher valua-
tion than if a subsidy is valued without considering the time-value of
money. 70 The value of the grants in Michelin, which did not reflect
the time-value of money, would increase when the time-value of
money is considered. Thus, the corresponding tariff, which is based
on the value of the grant, also would increase.
By its nature, the consideration of the time-value of money is a
valuation refinement that will result in higher CVD determinations in
the future. Also by its nature, consideration of the time-value of
money is a refinement that results in valuing a grant in excess of its
face value, which according to the Commerce Department, violates
CVD law.7 1 The Michelin court, however, did not read the law to
limit the valuation of a subsidy to its face amount. On the contrary,
the court reasoned that the law foresees a process of measurement,
and providing for the time-value of money is "in harmony with the
law." 72
In valuing subsidies, the Commerce Department is concerned
primarily with using reasonable valuation methods in measuring the
benefit of the subsidy to its recipient. 73 In keeping with these legisla-
tive directives, the consideration of the time-value of money is a rea-
sonable, generally accepted principle of financial analysis that more
accurately measures the benefit of a subsidy to its recipient. 7
4
68 See supra notes 27 & 46 and accompanying text.
69 Michelin, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade at 255-56. This alternative was suggested in the amicus
curiae brief filed by the U.S. Rubber Manufacturers Association.
70 This presumes that a positive discount rate is used in the time-value of money
calculation.
71 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
72 Michelin, No. 83-136, slip op. at 15-16.
73 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
74 Michelin, No. 83-136, slip op. at 16.
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2. Present Value of an Annuity
In its latest Michelin determination, the Department specifically
endorsed the annuity method of measuring the time-value of
money.7 5 The CIT, in its third and final Michelin review, found the
use of the annuity method inappropriate for valuing subsidies. 76 Use
of the annuity method, as with any method of measuring the time-
value of money, would have resulted in a higher valuation of the
Michelin grants.7 7
Although the annuity method may be reasonable and represents
generally accepted principles of financial analysis, its equal install-
ments do not accurately express the benefit received in each year in
the same manner in which an enterprise's commercial alternatives
would be expressed. As the court noted, it merely equalizes amounts
that should be different in each year to reflect a decline in princi-
pal. 78 In this respect, the annuity method is inconsistent with the
"benefit to the recipient" standard.
The annuity method is most commonly used in calculating stan-
dard home mortgage repayment schedules. The technique is easy to
understand and apply, and it provides convenient, constant periodic
payments for the mortgagor. In a CVD proceeding, however, the
Commerce Department should not be concerned with a particular
formula's convenience and ease of application in valuing a subsidy.
CVD law focuses on the effects of subsidies on beneficiaries. The
actual benefit of a grant to its recipient cannot be ignored for the
sake of administrative convenience. 7 9
3. The Court's Declining-Balance Formula
In its third and final review, the Michelin court recommended its
own formula for measuring the time-value of money.8 0 Under the
formula, the principal amount of the grant is allocated on a straight-
line basis over the life of the asset acquired by the grant. Interest
expense is then added to that amount, based on the alternative com-
mercial rate that the recipient would have paid on the remaining bal-
ance of the principal. 8 1 This declining-balance method not only
75 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
76 Michelin, No. 83-136, slip op. at 8.
77 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
78 Michelin, No. 83-136, slip op. at 9.
79 Indeed, the Commerce Department concedes that the method facilitates its annual
reviews of CVD assessments required under § 751 of the Trade Act. Carbon Steel Prod-
ucts from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 5142, 5149 (1984).
80 Michelin, No. 83-136, slip op. at 14.
81 The formula is expressed as:
B = p/n + r[p - (x - 1)(p/n)]
where B = benefit to be countervailed in a given year; p = face amount of the subsidy; n
= number of years of the benefit; r = discount rate; x = unknown amount of the annual
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achieves some degree of front loading but also maintains a constant
correspondence between the actual benefit and the amount to be
countervailed.
The use of the declining-balance method will result in a higher
valuation of the Michelin grants than would the use of the Com-
merce Department's annuity method.82 Higher valuations result in
higher tariffs. Although the declining-balance method further aggra-
vates the harsh impact that time-value of money calculations will
have on future CVD assessments, the method more accurately meas-
ures the benefit of a grant to its recipient. Moreover, by the Com-
merce Department's own admission, the method is reasonable under
the legislative standard of valuing subsidies. 83
payment. When the court's formula is applied to a hypothetical $10,000 grant over ten
years, assuming the discount rate is 10%, the results are:
Year I
(i) B = 000 + .1[10,000 - (1 - 1)1,000)]
10
(ii) B = 1,000 + 1,000, or 2,000
Year 2
(i) B = - + .1[10,000 - (2 - 1)1,000)]
10
(ii) B = 1,000 + 900, or 1,900
Year 3
(i) B = 10 + .1[10,000 - (3 - 1)1,000)]
10
(ii) B = 1,000 + 800, or 1,800
Year 10
(i) B = 10- + .1[10,000 - (10 - 1)1,000)]
i0
(ii) B = 1,000 + 100, or 1,100
82 The following compares the two methods using a hypothetical $10,000 grant over
ten years, assuming a 10% discount rate:
Annuity Method Declining Balance Method
Year I - 1,480 Year I - 2,000
Year 2 - 1,480 Year 2 - 1,900
Year 3 - 1,480 Year 3 - 1,800
Year 4 - 1,480 Year 4 - 1,700
Year 5 - 1,480 Year 5 - 1,600
Year 6 - 1,480 Year 6 - 1,500
Year 7 - 1,480 Year 7 - 1,400
Year 8 - 1,480 Year 8 - 1,300
Year 9 - 1,480 Year 9 - 1,200
Year 10 - 1,480 Year 10 - 1,100
Total 14,800 15,500
83 Carbon Steel Products from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 5142, 5149 (1984).
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4. The Discount Rate
Time-value of money calculations require the use of a discount
rate that reflects the company's time preference for money. If a com-
pany is indifferent to receiving one hundred dollars today or receiv-
ing one hundred and ten dollars next year, its discount rate for the
intervening year is ten percent. 84 The third Michelin opinion rejected
the Commerce Department's use of the rate on long-term Canadian
government bonds as the discount rate in measuring the effects of
time on money. 8 5 Instead, the court stated that the more accurate
measure of opportunity cost is the commercial rate that the benefici-
ary would have obtained in the marketplace. 8 6 In most cases, the
alternative financing rate will exceed the rate on long-term govern-
ment bonds. 87 Thus, the use of the alternative financing rate will
result in higher valuations and tariffs than would the use of the risk-
free bond rate.
The Commerce Department has explained that the rationale for
using the risk-free bond rate was to avoid judging the riskiness of a
particular undertaking. 88 The more compelling reason for the use of
a ready-calculated risk-free bond rate, however, is to avoid the incon-
venience of determining what the alternative rate of financing would
have been in each case.8 9 In reality, different companies invest in
different projects of varying degrees of risk. The point at which a
high risk firm will be indifferent to receiving sums in the future (its
discount rate), will be higher than a firm that is more adverse to risk.
Thus, it is unrealistic to apply the same discount rate to every enter-
prise. Additionally, if the alternative rate of financing is not used, it
is possible that an outright grant-the most complete and generous
form of subsidy-will be measured by a looser standard than a pref-
erential interest rate loan. 90
The refinements in valuation expressed by the Michelin court al-
ter three components of the Department's methodology that have
been either elided or homogenized for administrative convenience.
If a recipient of a grant enjoys greater benefit in the early years of the
life of asset purchased by the grant, the Department compresses the
84 Id. at 5148.
85 Michelin, No. 83-136, slip op. at 12.
86 Id. The Court deferred to the Commerce Department to determine what the alter-
native rate of financing would have been. Id.
87 Long-term government bonds are risk free due to the financial stability of govern-
ments offering the bonds. Consequently, in a risk versus return analysis, this high degree
of safety (low risk) yields relatively low return. Even offerings by the most creditworthy
corporations are more risky than government bonds, and such corporations cannot bor-
row at less than the risk free rate.
88 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
89 The Commerce Department considers such determinations to be "speculation."
Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,316 (1982).
90 Michelin, No. 83-136, slip op. at 11.
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allocation of its benefit to a convenient one-half of the asset's life.
Similarly, the Department uses convenient, readily accessible, easy-
to-read mortgage tables in valuing money over time. As the discount
rate in valuing money over time, the Department uses a foreign gov-
ernment-determined, risk-free bond rate. All these techniques are
applied without regard to the actual "benefit to the recipient"-the
standard the Department supposedly follows in valuing subsidies.
Since the Michelin decisions, the Commerce Department has im-
plemented two of the three refinements called for in the case. For
the most part, the Department has abandoned the half-life approach
of front loading benefits. 9 ' It also has changed the discount rate
used in time-value calculations from the risk-free bond rate to a com-
pany's average weighted cost of capital.9 2 The Department contin-
ues, however, to use the annuity method of valuing money over time.
It cites administrative convenience and flaws in the declining balance
method as reasons for the continued use of the annuity method. 93
V. Conclusion
Despite the enactment of the Trade Act and subsequent im-
provements to trade law under the Trade Act, 94 industry dissatisfac-
tion with increasing foreign presence in the United States still
exists.9 5 Each year thousands of CVD petitions are filed, and hun-
dreds are investigated, challenging imports from every major trading
partner of the United States involving nearly every major industry. It
is clear, therefore, why the Commerce Department has chosen con-
venient methods of valuing subsidies. Examining the effects of a
subsidy, however, is the very nature of CVD law, and valuing such
subsidies is an integral component that cannot be neglected for the
sake of administrative convenience. Less accurate duty assessments,
for whatever reason, is contrary to CVD law and the needs of U.S.
industries that are injured by foreign subsidized merchandise.
The call for refinements in valuation by the Michelin court illus-
trates that, despite the Department's workload, valuing subsidies is
as important as the fundamental issue of countervailability, and the
process should not be compromised. When CVD law no longer pro-
91 On small grants, the Commerce Department allocates benefits over one year. See
supra note 49.
92 Carbon Steel Products from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 5142, 5149 (1984).
93 Id. Under the declining-balance method, the Commerce Department contends
that the allocation of one year grants, or small grants that the Department typically allo-
cates over one year, may exceed the face value of the subsidy in violation of the subsidy
"cap." See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. The court dismissed this argument
when applied to the use of the time-value of money calculations. See supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
94 See Barshefsky, Mattice, & Martin, supra note 4.
95 Indeed, the past session of Congress experienced a flood of protectionist trade
reform proposals.
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vides U.S. industries with the protection they desire, strict interpre-
tation of valuation principles can provide an added degree of
protection. The court has interpreted "reasonable methods of mea-
suring benefit to the recipient" to require the use of methods that
most accurately reflect benefit to the recipient. The Michelin court's
interpretation, refinements, and underlying analyses provide much
needed guidance and policy on the issue of valuation.
-DAVID A. SPURIA

